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COMPENSATION SYSTEMS AND EFFICIENT DETERRENCE
JENNIFER H. ARLEN*
INTRODUCTION
Most people agree that the tort system is in serious need of re-
form: victims often cannot afford the expense or the delay associ-
ated with pursuing their claims to resolution, successful plaintiffs
with serious physical injuries are undercompensated, and potential
defendants complain of crushing liability, much of which goes to ad-
ministrative costs-including attorneys fees-and not to victims. It
is not surprising, then, that legal scholars and legislators are increas-
ingly interested in alternatives to the tort system, such as the admin-
istrative compensation plans presented in this Symposium.
These proposals-which are intended to supplant the tort sys-
tem to a considerable degree-represent a dramatic improvement
over the current tort system in many respects. Each proposed sys-
tem would substantially lower administrative costs and would im-
prove the compensation of injured victims. Compensating victims,
however, is not the only goal of the tort system. Another central
goal is to reduce accident costs by deterring the creation of risks.
Accordingly, in order to properly evaluate the proposed compensa-
tion systems, it is necessary to consider the likely effect of these pro-
posals on expected accident costs, and to determine whether the
present proposals can be reformed to better serve the goal of effi-
cient deterrence, while still retaining their desirable effects on victim
compensation.
In examining the impact of the compensation system proposals
on deterrence and compensation, the present analysis will focus on
two features common to each of the plans presented in this Sympo-
sium: (1) the elimination of fault-based liability and (2) the restric-
tion (or elimination) of recovery for nonpecuniary losses in physical
injury cases. The present analysis reveals that for some types of ac-
cidents these aspects of the proposed compensation systems pro-
* Visiting Professor, University of Southern California Law Center; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Emory Law School. B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Ph.D. (Economics),
New York University. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Richard
Craswell, Harriet King, Andrew Kull, Paul Rubin, and Gary Schwartz. An earlier version
of this paper was presented to the Torts and Compensation Systems Section at the 1993
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
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mote both efficient compensation-that is, efficient risk
spreading'-and efficient deterrence. In other contexts, however,
these features of administrative compensation systems reduce indi-
viduals' incentives to reduce risk, resulting in an inefficient increase
in expected accident costs. In those situations where adopting a
compensation system is inconsistent with the goal of efficient deter-
rence, the resulting increase in expected accident costs must be con-
sidered a cost of adopting the new system-to be weighed against
the benefits-in any consideration of whether the plan should be
adopted. Finally, this commentary suggests ways of improving each
proposal to better serve the goal of efficient deterrence while retain-
ing the relatively low administrative costs and the broad victim com-
pensation characteristic of a compensation system.
Because the deterrent effect of a compensation system depends
on the type of accident involved, this Article considers four types of
accidents separately. Section I examines accidents between stran-
gers2 that result from activities in which one person unilaterally im-
poses a risk of injury on others ("unilateral risk activities")-such as
injuries to local residents resulting from environmental harms-and
considers Professor Rabin's suggested compensation system to gov-
ern environmental mass toxic tort cases.' Section II examines bilat-
eral risk accidents between strangers-accidents in which both
potential parties to the accident risk injury-and considers Profes-
1. Under economic theory, victim compensation functions largely as a form of in-
surance against loss; compensation is optimal when it equals the efficient level of insur-
ance coverage or is less than this level and potential victims are able to purchase
insurance on the open market. Efficiency is defined for purposes of this Article as
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, under which a reallocation of resources is efficient if the winners
could compensate the losers; there is no separate requirement that victims be made no
worse off than they would have been without the reallocation. This is in contrast with
the Pareto criterion, which requires that the reallocation not make anyone worse off, and
benefit at least one person. Accordingly, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require
full compensation of victims, whereas the Pareto criterion does. For a comparison of
Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency in the wrongful death context, see Jennifer H. Arlen,
Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for lWrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113
(1985) [hereinafter Arlen, Note]; cf. Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for
Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 69-70, 81-
84 (1990) [hereinafter Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules] (arguing that full ex post compensation
may not be necessary for efficiency under the Pareto criterion when both potential par-
ties to the accident risk injury).
2. Throughout this Article, the term "strangers" refers to individuals who are not
in a market or consensual relationship.
3. See Robert T. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993). The terms "environmental mass toxic
torts" and "environmental hazard cases" are used in this Article to refer to personal
injury and death claims resulting from an injurer's contamination of the environment.
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sor O'Connell and Michael Horowitz's new no-fault proposal to
govern automobile accidents.4 Section III examines accidents be-
tween people in a market relationship, and considers Professor Ra-
bin's compensation system proposal as applied to product-related
mass toxic torts. Much of this analysis also would apply to liability
rules and compensation systems governing work-related injuries to
employees. Section IV also examines accidents between people in a
market relationship and considers Professor Weiler's proposal for
no-fault medical liability. 5
I. UNILATERAL RISK ACCIDENTS BETWEEN STRANGERS
Injuries to community residents caused by a producer's hazard-
ous waste or other environmental pollutant is a classic example of a
unilateral risk accident between strangers. Generally, these injuries
are governed by the tort system;6 usually a rule of strict liability ap-
plies.7 Accordingly, this section compares Professor Rabin's propo-
sal with a system of strict or absolute tort liability.'
Noting the long delays and huge administrative costs associated
with tort liability for mass toxic torts, Professor Rabin considers the
possibility of handling these cases under an administrative compen-
sation system.9 Under Professor Rabin's proposed compensation
system, producer liability would be absolute, and each victim's re-
covery generally would be limited to pecuniary losses (for example,
4. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Marhet, 52 MD. L.
REV. 1016 (1993).
5. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993).
6. One exception is nuclear accidents, which are governed by the administrative
compensation scheme established by the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
For an insightful critique of this administrative compensation system, see Rabin, supra
note 3, at 955-57.
7. Most states have adopted the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866),
aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (opinions of Justice Blackburn and Lord Cairns), which
holds land users strictly liable for injuries resulting from the escape of abnormally haz-
ardous substances or "non-natural" use of land. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 78, at 545-49 (5th ed. 1984). In addition, many
activities involving hazardous waste would be considered "abnormally dangerous" for
purposes of imposing strict liability under the guidelines established by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977) (providing
guidelines for defining abnormally dangerous activities subject to strict liability).
8. Following the convention of most of the Law and Economics literature, this Arti-
cle uses the terms strict and absolute liability interchangeably, while recognizing that the
legal definitions of the two terms differ.
9. Although Professor Rabin's focus is on product-related mass injury cases, his
proposal explicitly covers mass toxic injuries resulting from environmental hazards. Ra-
bin, supra note 3, at 964. Rabin does observe, however, that if mass environmental torts
were the only mass tort cases, a compensation system might not be necessary. Id.
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lost wages and medical expenses). Victims of very severe injuries
would be permitted modest recovery for nonpecuniary losses.' °
Professor Rabin's compensation system would exist alongside
the tort system: an injured victim could pursue a claim in one or the
other system, but not in both. Under Professor Rabin's scheme, vic-
tims would be under considerable pressure to accept the recovery
offered by the compensation system, however, because a victim who
pursues a tort remedy and loses could end up with no recovery at
all." The victims most likely to pursue a remedy in tort would be
those with clear claims to recovery-the very victims who should be
channeled into a compensation system.
A. Strict Liability and Efficient Deterrence
Because Professor Rabin's suggested compensation system
would substitute (to a large extent) a compensation scheme for tort
recovery for mass torts, it is important to examine the impact of his
system on expected accident costs, and to consider whether the pro-
posal can be improved to deter risk more effectively.' 2
Under economic theory, the optimal level of risk for any partic-
ular activity is the level at which the total social cost of accidents is
minimized-that is, the level that minimizes the cost of reducing (or
eliminating) the risk in question, plus the expected cost to the mem-
bers of society of the resulting injuries.' To deter risk efficiently,
society must induce individuals to take the efficient level of care
when engaging in a risky activity and to engage in the efficient level
of the activity. 4 Standard economic analysis has shown that in the
unilateral risk context, strict liability rules can be used to induce
both efficient caretaking and efficient activity levels, because strict
liability can be employed to force injurers to bear the full social cost
10. Id. at 971.
11. The tort system would be less attractive to victims than it is at present, because
Professor Rabin favors limiting tort damages for nonpecuniary losses, id., rendering the
guaranteed recovery under the compensation system all the more attractive.
12. Rabin himself acknowledges that a compensation system for mass torts may not
be desirable, but his reasons for concern-and his possible solutions-differ from those
presented here.
13. See generally WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW ch. 2 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 5-46,
215-17 (1987); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Theory and Fact in the Law of Accidents, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1024, 1034-36 (1985) (discussing the theory of deterrence and applying it to the
no-fault system).
14. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 363, 365-67 (1980); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 22 n.27 (1980).
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of any risks they create.' 5 Potential injurers forced to pay the full
social costs of the risks that they create face efficient incentives to
reduce risk by increasing caretaking and decreasing activity fre-
quency to the efficient levels.
For strict liability to be efficient, however, an injurer's expected
liability must equal the total expected social cost of the risk imposed
on others. If an injurer's expected liability is less than the costs im-
posed on others, strict liability will not force the injurer to fully in-
ternalize the social costs of her activity; she will exercise too little
care and engage in too much of the activity. 16
In addition, in the real world, liability insurance may undermine
the efficient incentives created by strict liability by shifting the costs
of risk-taking from the potential injurer to the insurance company,
thereby undermining the injurer's incentives to incur costs to re-
duce risk. Accordingly, a second requirement for absolute liability
to be efficient is that liability insurance, if available, must be
designed to preserve injurers' incentives to incur costs to reduce
risk. This goal is achieved either if injurers "self-insure," or if injur-
ers purchase third-party insurance with risk-based (e.g., experience-
rated) premiums and deductibles such that each injurer bears the
full cost of her expected risk-taking in the form of higher premiums
and direct payments to victims.' 7
Because the ability of strict liability to provide efficient incen-
tives depends substantially on whether damage awards are efficient,
it is necessary to determine the appropriate damage awards for acci-
dents resulting in death and physical injury. In order to force injur-
ers to internalize fully the costs they impose on others, damage
awards must equal the amount necessary to fully compensate those
15. See Shavell, supra note 14, at 2-3.
16. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1539-40 (1984).
It must be recognized that, in the case of environmental harms, the deterrent effect of
strict liability is muted by various tort doctrines that limit an injured victim's ability to
sue in tort for physical injury resulting from environmental harms. See Don Dewees &
Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its Alternatives: A Review of Empirical
Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 57, 108-09 (1992). To the extent that the actual tort
system differs from the liability system presented here, the present analysis suggests that
reform of the present system should be considered.
17. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 COR-
NELL L. REV. 313, 337-38 (1990) (arguing that insurance does not eliminate the deter-
rent effect of liability under the current tort system because many risk imposers are not
insured, and those who are insured often have policies with experience-rated premiums,
policy limits, and deductibles).
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who suffer these costs. 8 It is not necessary-or even desirable-to
base the deterrence damage award on the amount necessary to fully
compensate injured victims for their losses, however. For deter-
rence purposes, the cost of an injurer's risky activity is best mea-
sured as the cost of the risk she imposes on each affected person, not
the cost of any resulting injuries. Accordingly, the social cost of the
activity is the amount necessary to compensate each person on
whom the risk was imposed for the amount of the risk-regardless
of whether that person is ever injured. The efficient damage award
under this risk-based measure of social costs would be the total cost
of the risk to the affected population, divided by the expected
number of victims.' 9
B. The Deterrence Effect of Rabin's Proposal
The preceding analysis reveals that Professor Rabin's proposal
for a mass tort compensation system based on absolute liability
would promote efficient deterrence. In fact, from this standpoint,
18. In other words, the proper measure is what economists call the "compensation
demand" value of death or injury. See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
90-92 (1991) (the deterrence measure of life is the amount one must pay people to
accept the risk of death); E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach,
79J. POL. ECON. 687, 693-94 (1971) (the proper method for valuing a risk of death is to
determine the amount that compensates each person for the additional risk to which she
will be exposed).
19. See Arlen, Note, supra note 1, at 1128-34. This risk-based measure of the social
cost of risky activities is generally accepted as the appropriate measure of the efficient
deterrence damage award. See, e.g., VlscusI, supra note 18, at 89-91. The risk-based
measure of the social cost of the injurer's activity is likely to differ significantly from a
measure based on the cost to injured victims of the harm suffered because serious physi-
cal injuries impact directly on the victim's utility function, changing the victim's valua-
tion of wealth. The most extreme example of this is death: an individual who previously
might have placed a very high value on money may well attach no value at all to money
paid to her after she is dead. Consider an activity that imposes a 1/10,000 risk of death
on a population of 10,000 people, and thus has an expected cost of one human life. If
one views the cost of the activity as the expected loss of one life, then the social cost of
the activity is probably infinite, because no finite sum paid to the dead individual can
compensate her for her loss. This would suggest that the injurer should be deterred
completely from engaging in the risky activity unless the activity produces infinite bene-
fits. By contrast, if one views the cost of the injurer's activity as being the cost of the risk
imposed on the population, the proper measure of the deterrence value of the harm is
the amount necessary to compensate each of the 10,000 potential victims for the
1/10,000 increased risk of death, assuming that the money is paid to each potential
victim regardless of whether she is injured. In other words, the total social cost of the
injurer's risky activity is 10,000 X C, where 10,000 is the number of people affected by
the risk, and C is the amount that fully compensates each individual for a 1/10,000 in-
creased risk of death. This amount will be finite, and may even be relatively small. The
per victim measure of the cost of the injurer's risky activity is the total social cost of the
risk divided by the expected number of victims (which here is one). See id.
1098 [VOL.. 52:1093
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Professor Rabin's system may even be preferable to the current sys-
tem to the extent that currently various tort doctrines restrict in-
jured victims' ability to recover.20 Professor Rabin's system also can
be expected to have substantially lower administrative costs than the
current tort system.
Nevertheless, the beneficial effect of Professor Rabin's proposal
on injurers' incentives to reduce risk to efficient levels could be dra-
matically improved by altering two aspects of his proposal: (1) the
provision that potential injurers' liability to the system need not be
experience-rated initially,2' and (2) his decision to exclude most
nonpecuniary losses from the system. 22 These two aspects of Pro-
fessor Rabin's proposal are inconsistent with the requirement for
efficient deterrence that potential injurers bear all the costs they im-
pose on others.
Professor Rabin is skeptical about whether experience-rating
promotes deterrence, but argues that it may be desirable in order to
promote corrective justice. Initially, however, he envisions a flat tax
linked to gross revenues.2 3 Experience rating is more important
than Rabin suggests, however. Proper concern for deterrence re-
quires that each potential injurer's contributions to the system be
experience-rated so that each injurer bears more directly the costs
of the risks she actually creates. This risk-based liability should be-
gin immediately with contributions to the system being based on the
expected cost of the potential injurer's activity, given known risks.
Although basing contributions on expected risk certainly would in-
crease administrative costs, this is not a sufficient argument against
doing so. Rather, analysts must determine whether the costs of cal-
culating risk-based premiums in the initial phase of the program
outweigh the social benefits flowing from the resulting reduction in
expected accident costs. Moreover, there probably are relatively
low-cost methods for aligning an injurer's contributions more
closely with the risks he actually creates: for example, liability to the
system could be made to depend on the nature of the potential in-
jurer's business (including the amount and type of waste produced),
the potential injurer's accident record, proof of compliance with
various safety regulations, and the implementation of an effective
compliance program designed to deter improper dumping of waste.
20. See supra note 16.
21. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 977-78.
22. Id. at 971.
23. Id. at 977-78.
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Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, even if the potential
injurer's premium payments to the system are "experience-rated,"
Professor Rabin's system will not deter risk creation efficiently if the
amount of each potential injurer's "premium" payment is deter-
mined by the expected amount of compensation paid by the system
to the injurer's expected victims. For an absolute liability rule to be
efficient, an injurer's liability to the system must equal the total cost
of the risk the injurer imposes on the affected population.24 Yet
under Professor Rabin's system, each victim's recovery generally is
limited to her pecuniary losses. The available empirical evidence
suggests that the social cost of activities that risk physical injury far
exceeds the total pecuniary losses of each of the expected victims.
For example, empirical analysis of the amount workers require to
compensate them for risk reveals that blue-collar workers receive an
extra $300-$600 in wage compensation each year for bearing an av-
erage risk of fatality of one in 10,000.25 This translates into an im-
plicit per victim value of life of $3-$6 million. This amount far
exceeds the expected pecuniary losses of virtually all potential vic-
tims. Accordingly, to provide efficient incentives to deter risk, Pro-
fessor Rabin ideally would amend his proposal to provide that each
injurer's liability to the system be based on the cost of the risks he
creates-assuming, of course, that these could be measured-and
not on the cost to the system of compensating the victims' pecuniary
losses.26
This is not to say, however, that Professor Rabin is incorrect in
concluding that a victim's recovery should be limited to her pecuni-
ary losses. Such a limitation appears to promote efficient risk-
spreading by victims. Economic analysis of insurance reveals that
rational individuals do not fully insure against all pecuniary and
24. See supra text accompanying note 19.
25. Viscusi, supra note 18, at 108-09. This implicit value of life is not, however, the
same for all individuals. As one might expect, people select occupations with different
risk levels depending in part on their attitudes towards risk and the implicit value they
attach to their lives. Workers in high-risk jobs generally are those who attach a lower
value to their lives: studies of these workers reveal implicit life valuations of $1 million
or less. Workers in lower risk jobs, by contrast, appear to have implicit life valuations of
$ 10 million or more. Id. at 108. Valuations of nonfatal injuries range between $12,000
and $50,000 per injury. Id. at 109-10.
26. The calculation of each injurer's liability could be based on the choices the mem-
bers of the affected population actually have made regarding willingness to accept risk in
return for compensation. Such calculations would not be particularly susceptible to
fraud and would be easy to make in environmental hazard mass tort cases, where the size
of the affected population is relatively easy to determine and the magnitude of the risk
imposed is likely to be relatively constant across the affected population.
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nonpecuniary losses associated with injury (or death).27 Thus, full
compensation recovery exceeds the recovery level that permits vic-
tims to spread risk efficiently.2 8 In fact, many analysts argue that
individuals only desire insurance coverage for the pecuniary losses
associated with a physical injury and do not want any coverage
against the nonpecuniary losses. 29 Given that inducing victim risk
spreading is the central economic justification for allowing victims
to recover, 30 permitting victims to recover more than the optimum
amount of insurance coverage is not necessary for efficiency. Nor,
in fact, is it desirable to permit this excessive recovery because it
shifts resources from healthy individuals to partially-compensated
27. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 247-51; Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham,
The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. ECON.
143 (1977) (showing that full insurance coverage for nonpecuniary losses exceeds effi-
cient insurance coverage). The standard condition for efficient risk-spreading is that a
potential victim optimally spreads a risk of injury-thereby maximizing her utility-
when she allocates her wealth before and after the injury so that she derives the same
benefit (utility) from her last dollar of wealth whether injured or uninjured. This condi-
tion is efficient because, if the individual derived more utility from wealth after the injury
than she did before it, she could purchase additional insurance, thereby increasing her
total expected utility by transferring wealth from herself when healthy to herself once
injured. See SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 186-205, 228-61. The reason full insurance
against physical injuries is not efficient is that the marginal utility of additional wealth for
a fully insured individual is lower should the accident occur than if the accident does not
occur. Id. at 228-30. Therefore, a potential victim with full insurance coverage would
be better off if she transferred wealth from the injured state to the uninjured state by
reducing her insurance coverage. Id.
28. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 247-51.
29. Whether the efficient risk-spreading award equals or exceeds the victim's purely
pecuniary loss remains a matter of considerable debate. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Paul
H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
371 (1992) (considering in detail optimal insurance under various assumptions about
the effect of an injury on the victim's marginal utility); Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra
note 1, at 73 n.149 (arguing that optimal insurance coverage may include coverage for
nonpecuniary losses); Stephen P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alter-
native Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 51-75 (1991)
(same); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L. J.
1521, 1547 (1987) (arguing that individuals only insure for pecuniary losses); Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,
367 (1988) (same); Viscusi, supra note 18, at 89-90 (arguing that the optimal amount of
insurance coverage may be greater, less than, or equal to the victim's purely pecuniary
losses). The limited empirical evidence on the subject seems to support the conclusion
that individuals do not insure against the nonpecuniary losses associated with physical
injuries. See W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions that Depend on Health
Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 353, 371 (1990). This evi-
dence is not conclusive, however.
30. Deterrence depends on the injurer's expected liability, not the amount of recov-
ery, provided that recovery is sufficient to induce victims to bring suit. Victim risk-
spreading, by contrast, depends on the amount of recovery by the victim. See supra note
1.
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injured individuals who derive less utility from the additional
money.
This analysis suggests that Professor Rabin's proposal to limit
victims' recovery to purely pecuniary losses probably would pro-
mote efficient risk-spreading. Nevertheless, the question arises:
how could a compensation system be designed to induce both effi-
cient risk-spreading and efficient deterrence? The answer to this
question highlights another advantage of a properly designated
compensation system over the current tort system. Under the tort
system, a strict liability rule cannot achieve both efficient deterrence
and efficient risk-spreading because the damage award necessary to
deter risk efficiently precludes risk spreading by victims. 31 A com-
pensation system, if properly designed, can achieve both goals. One
way to do this would be to require each injurer to pay an amount
equal to the efficient deterrence damage award for the risks she im-
posed into a common fund.3 2 The fund would then award to each
victim an amount equal to the efficient risk-spreading award plus
litigation expenses. The excess money in the fund could be used to
administer the system and to provide a cushion against the possibil-
ity that some of those who create environmental risks will not con-
tribute to the system; any additional funds could be distributed to
the affected population in lump sum payments.3 3 This revised com-
31. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 228-61; but cf. Jennifer H. Arlen, Liability for
Physical Injury When Injurers as well as Victims Suffer Losses, 8 J. LAw, ECON. & ORGAN. 411
(1992) (the conflict between deterrence and risk-spreading may not exist when both
parties to the accident risk injury). The magnitude of the problem may be less than it
appears even under strict liability. Under the current tort system, a substantial portion
of the damage award paid by the injurer goes to people other than the victim-for exam-
ple, the victim's lawyer. Because deterrence depends on the amount paid by the injurer,
whereas risk-spreading depends on the amount received by the victim, these litigation
costs increase the possibility that the tort system may be able to achieve both efficient
deterrence and efficient risk-spreading, even under a rule of strict liability. This possi-
bility becomes stronger once one recognizes that, under current law, litigation costs
generally equal the victim's pain and suffering award, in which case victims in effect are
compensated only for their purely pecuniary losses even though injurers pay considera-
ble amounts for pain and suffering. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 114.
32. If it is difficult to measure the exact amount of the risk each injurer imposes, it
might be possible to send the correct incentives to injurers by requiring them to pay into
a common fund an amount equal to the deterrence value of life (or injury) every time
they injure a victim.
33. The tort system could be reformed to have a similar effect by basing the victim's
recovery on the efficient insurance amount, with the injurer paying an additional fine to
the state. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal
Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RANDJ. EcON. 562 (1991); SHAVELL, supra note 13, at
233; Viscusi, supra note 18, at 92. Attempts to achieve this goal in the tort context-for
example, through damage caps and statutes providing that the state gets a share of puni-
tive damages-have had mixed success in part because many of these statutes have met
[VOL. 52:10931102
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pensation system would be consistent with efficient deterrence in
that each injurer's liability would equal the costs she actually im-
poses, and it would promote efficient risk-spreading by victims. 34
Distributing the system's excess funds to the population affected by
the risk (instead of awarding excess compensation to injured par-
tially-compensated victims) would promote social welfare by award-
ing the money to people when they are healthy and derive more
utility from it.
35
Professor Rabin might reject these suggestions because he be-
lieves that deterrence should not be heavily considered in the design
of a compensation system since it is not a primary goal of liability,
particularly in toxic tort cases.3 6 Imposing liability on firms does
not effectively control risk production, Professor Rabin claims, be-
cause many toxic tort risks are unforeseeable at the time they are
produced and because corporate managers tend not to take proper
account of the long-term consequences of their actions. 3 7 More-
over, Professor Rabin argues that deterrence concerns are less im-
portant in this area because various government regulations exist to
deter risk.38 In fact, many scholars have taken the next step and
suggested that deterrence is not a proper concern for either a liabil-
ity or compensation system, and should be left to government
regulation.39
The argument that risk control should be left to government
regulation cannot be defended either in theory or by the empirical
with various constitutional challenges. Most of these challenges would not be available
were recovery channeled through a compensation system.
34. In some situations victims' caretaking is also a concern. We need not be particu-
larly concerned about this issue in the mass environmental tort context, however, be-
cause usually there is little that potential victims can do to reduce the risk. Moreover,
awarding victims only part recovery for their losses provides victims with some incen-
tives to take measures to reduce the risk where such measures are possible.
35. Individuals necessarily would prefer to receive compensation when healthy, in-
stead of when injured, if the compensation system provides them with the efficient
amount of insurance coverage should they be injured. See supra note 27.
36. Rabin, supra note 3, at 977.
37. Id.
38. See id. (arguing that statutes like CERCLA and RCRA diminish the significance of
liability rules in achieving optimal deterrence).
39. For example, throughout his recent book on products liability, Kip Viscusi seems
to suggest that it might be preferable to rely on regulation to control product-related
injuries. Viscusi, supra note 18, passim; see also O'Connell, supra note 4. The discussion
of the actual behavior of regulatory agencies in Viscusi's book et al., however, provides
strong evidence of regulatory failure, not regulatory success. Viscusi, supra note 18, at
122. See Paul Rubin, Book Review, 11 CATOJ. 332, 334 (1991) (reviewing Viscusi, supra
note 18); see also Jennifer H. Arlen, Book Review, 30J. ECON. LIT. 2170, 2171-72 (1992)
(same).
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evidence, notwithstanding the limitations of liability and compensa-
tion systems. This argument in favor of regulation is based largely
on the idea that regulators have more expertise in the area than the
courts, and therefore will make better-informed judgments about
what risks are acceptable. But this argument implicitly assumes that
legislators and government regulators attempt to enact rules that
improve social welfare. Both theory and empirical evidence sug-
gest, however, that we cannot rely on legislatures and administrative
agencies to act in the public interest. Public Choice theory argues
that legislators-like everyone else-are rational, self-interested
utility maximizers.40 Many legislators, accordingly, act in order to
maximize their chances of getting re-elected, 4' not to benefit society
at large. This desire to get re-elected causes many legislators to
support laws that favor well-organized groups with concentrated in-
fluence and wealth, even if, on net, the laws will hurt society as a
whole.4" Thus, we cannot confidently rely on legislators to regulate
risk efficiently. Similar political pressures bear on administrative
agencies and should leave us wary of relying on these agencies to
efficiently regulate risk creation. 4' This conclusion is confirmed by
the empirical evidence demonstrating the inability of regulatory
agencies to reduce environmental risks effectively.44 Accordingly, it
is far from clear that society can rely on government regulation to
deter risk.45 Deterrence, therefore, should remain a primary goal of
40. For a good introduction to Public Choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
41. See id. at 22. Some legislators also have issues they are particularly concerned
about. In focusing on these issues, the legislators still are maximizing their own utility,
and can be counted on to pursue efficiency only if efficiency happens to be a goal a
particular legislator considers important.
42. Id. at 23. The public at large exerts less political pressure than well-organized
groups because the members of the public probably are not sufficiently informed to
know that particular legislation hurts their interests. Moreover, even if they are in-
formed, members of a large group-such as "the public"--are plagued by collective-
action problems, such as the "free rider" problem, that render effective political action
costly and unlikely. By contrast, smaller groups with a concentrated stake in a particular
piece of legislation (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry) are more likely to be aware of the
effect of the legislation on them, and-because of their higher individual stake in the
legislation-will be more likely to exert effective political pressure to make their wishes
known. These pressures often will result in legislation being enacted which favors well-
organized, smaller and well-funded groups over the interests of society at large. Id.
43. See generally id. at 12-37; Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in ll'orkers' Com-
pensation: The Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983, 986 (1993) (explicitly rec-
ognizing the deleterious impact of interest-group politicking on the design of
California's workers' compensation system).
44. See Dewees & Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 119-21; see supra note 39.
45. Additionally, increasing government regulation would provide legislators with
more opportunities to threaten industries with proposed regulation in order to extract
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any compensation or liability system.46
C. Conclusion
In conclusion, therefore, this analysis reveals that a modified
version of Professor Rabin's compensation system may well be pref-
erable to the tort system: liability is more nearly absolute; his
scheme has lower administrative costs;4 7 and under a compensation
system it is easier to reconcile the competing goals of efficient deter-
rence and efficient victim risk-spreading. In addition, Professor Ra-
bin's proposal to set each victim's recovery in an amount equal to
her pecuniary losses appears to promote efficient risk-spreading.
Professor Rabin's system could be greatly improved, however, by
making several changes designed to promote efficient deterrence.
Each potential injurer's liability to the system-that is, her premi-
ums-should equal the expected total cost of the risk she imposes
on others. Moreover, the proposed compensation system should be
the exclusive remedy for the mass toxic torts it covers. Specifically,
injuries from those hazards where the causal link has been estab-
lished and the potential injurer's liability to the system is relatively
easy to determine should be governed exclusively by the compensa-
tion system; victims of these injuries should not have the option to
sue in tort. Tort recovery (if any) should be limited to those situa-
tions where the hazard from the product in question was not known
in advance and, therefore, the potential injurer had not been con-
tributing to the compensation system for the risks created by this
campaign contributions from them. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Cre-
ation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 112-17 (1987).
46. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1034-36; Michael J. Trebilcock, Incentive
Issues in the Design of 'No-Fault' Compensation Systems, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19, 24-25 (1989).
Moreover, an administrative compensation scheme is not justifiable if its only goal is to
provide victims with insurance (compensation) because a better mechanism exists for
compensating victims: first-party insurance. Administrative costs are lower under first-
party insurance than under compensation systems. Weiler, supra note 5, at 926 (noting
that private health insurance spends approximately 5-10% of each claims dollar on ad-
ministration, while the administrative costs of compensation systems, such as workers'
compensation, consume roughly 20% of each claims dollar). Moreover, unlike a com-
pensation system, first-party insurance provides compensation to all those who are in-
jured, regardless of whether they can attribute their injury to a particular cause, thus
providing more uniform compensation. Finally, if compensation is desired because
some individuals cannot afford insurance, a lump-sum tax levied on each individual in
order to provide such compensation might well be a more effective means of providing
insurance than using a compensation system to effectively impose a tax on certain
industries.
47. See Weiler, supra note 5, at 926-928.
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Finally, further analysis may reveal that one additional change
in Professor Rabin's proposal is desirable. Although basing each
victim's recovery on her own pecuniary losses does promote effi-
cient risk-spreading, Gary Schwartz in his contribution to this Sym-
posium has shown that this recovery rule is particularly susceptible
to fraud and abuse.49 Under such a rule, victims have no incentive
to minimize their pecuniary losses and medical doctors benefit from
providing unnecessary treatment. If the costs of this fraud and
abuse are significant, it might well be preferable to. abandon an indi-
vidualized determination of each victim's recovery in favor of a re-
covery schedule under which each victim of a particular injury
receives a fixed amount based on expected pecuniary losses for that
victim's injury and income bracket. This rule would undercut the
market for fraudulent medical services that Professor Schwartz dis-
cusses, and would provide victims with strong incentives to return
to the labor force as soon as (and to the extent that is) possible.5"
II. BILATERAL RISK ACCIDENTS TO STRANGERS: AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS
We now turn to the proposal presented by Professor
O'Connell, Michael Horowitz, and Stephen Carroll for an expanded
no-fault system to govern automobile accidents. Although both the
48. Whether, and to what extent, the victim should be able to recover in tort in this
latter circumstance requires a more thorough analysis of the impact of the tort system on
injurers' incentives to discover and reveal risks than is possible to perform in this Arti-
cle. See infra text accompanying notes 92-104.
49. See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 988.
50. An additional consideration also appears to weigh in favor of a recovery schedule
under which each victim who suffers a particular injury receives the same amount. One
problem with a system that bases a victim's recovery on her pecuniary losses-including
lost income-is that it incorporates into our system for compensating victims the wage
discrimination that affects employment markets. Cf. MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V.
SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE PRACTICE BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 123-24, 127 (1990) (noting that recovery for injuries to women are affected
by the fact that median annual earnings for women are 60-65% of median earnings for
men; damage awards for minorities are similarly affected by earning differentials); Jane
Goodman et al., AMoney, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wvrongful Death Damage Awards, 25
LAW & Soc'y REV. 263, 268-69 (1991) (noting that differences in expected lost income
result in male decedents receiving substantially larger awards than female decedents); see
also Gail Cox, Juries Place Less Value on Homemakers: Wrongful Death Awards Are Higher for
'W1orking' Wives, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1; BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra, at 96
(noting that "housewives' " work-product is valued based on the $4.75 or so per hour it
would cost to replace their services). Employing a set recovery schedule would reduce
the effect on the compensation schedule of any discrimination present in the labor
markets.
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economic analysis of accidents and most torts scholarship focuses
on unilateral risk accidents-in which only one potential party to the
accident risks injury-bilateral risk accidents, such as automobile ac-
cidents, are the primary source of tort claims for serious permanent
injury and death in this country.5' Professor O'Connell is one of the
few torts scholars to recognize the importance of bilateral risk acci-
dents, particularly automobile accidents, devoting much of his ca-
reer to the issue of no-fault automobile insurance.
No-fault insurance differs from the current tort system in three
important respects: (1) it replaces the current fault system with a
system eliminating liability in certain circumstances; (2) it substi-
tutes first-party insurance for third-party insurance; and (3) it limits
recovery to purely pecuniary losses. Many states now have no-fault
insurance laws. These statutes generally preclude victims from su-
ing in tort if their injuries are below a certain amount. 52 Neverthe-
less, all current no-fault statutes allow victims of automobile
accidents to sue in tort if they have suffered serious physical inju-
ries.53 This enables victims of these accidents to seek recovery for
pain and suffering. This feature of current no-fault systems is con-
sidered by Professor O'Connell and his co-authors to be one of their
central failings. In their contribution to this Symposium, they argue
that we should replace the current system with a no-fault system in
which potential victims could agree to limit their recovery to purely
pecuniary losses in return for giving up the right to sue others in
tort for nonpecuniary losses.54
The "choice" feature of this new no-fault proposal is interest-
ing and innovative. The problem with the plan is that we can expect
it to diminish the deterrent effect of tort liability-especially if (as
the authors plausibly assume will happen) the great majority of driv-
ers do in fact opt out of the tort system. Furthermore, motorists will
opt out of the tort system if presented with this no-fault proposal
even though, when all the effects of a liability system are taken into
51. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
9 (1988) (noting that traffic accident claims account for about 40% of all tort cases).
52. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 84, at 606-08 (discussing the history of
states' adoption of no-fault compensation schemes).
53. See id. at 607 (discussing the Massachusetts statute, which permits a person to sue
in tort only if reasonable medical expenses exceed $500, or if death or serious bodily
injury results). Eight of the 24 states with no-fault statutes do not limit the victims'
ability to sue in tort. Id. Sixteen do limit this ability, but all permit tort recovery if
damages exceed a certain threshold; this threshold invariably will be met by those who
suffer serious permanent injury or death. Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 47.
54. O'Connell et al., supra note 4, at 1026.
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account, each individual might well be better off under the current
tort system than under the no-fault system. The reason for this is
simple. Tort liability provides potential victims with two benefits: it
reduces the amount of risk imposed on them by others and it pro-
vides a form of insurance coverage against injury. Individuals con-
sidering whether to accept Professor O'Connell's pure no-fault
alternative will ignore the deterrent effect of tort liability on others,
however, because each motorist will recognize that her decision to
opt out of the tort system will not have much effect on the expected
liability-and thus the risk-taking behavior-of other motorists.55
Accordingly, each motorist will decide whether to elect the no-fault
plan based only on the plan's impact on risk-spreading, assuming
that her decision will have no effect on the care and activity levels of
other drivers. Consequently, each motorist will opt for no-fault be-
cause it is the better option from an insurance standpoint, since it
limits coverage to pecuniary losses, which, as was previously estab-
lished, appears to be the optimal amount of coverage.56 Moreover,
any motorist desiring coverage against nonpecuniary losses can ob-
tain this coverage by opting for no-fault and purchasing first-party
accident insurance.5 Accordingly, in evaluating the "choice" no-
fault proposal, it is reasonable to assume that all motorists will se-
lect no-fault if it is available. The issue is whether this would be
socially desirable.
A. Efficient Rules for Automobile Accidents
To evaluate the proposed no-fault system, it is necessary to
consider the deterrent effects of negligence liability.5" To induce
efficient caretaking and risk-spreading in the bilateral risk context,
each person who imposes risk must bear both the cost to herself of
this risk and the cost of this risk to others. Previous analysis of auto-
55. Moreover, each motorist will recognize that each other motorist can avoid all tort
liability for automobile accidents by deciding to opt for Professor O'Connell's no-fault
system.
56. See Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 52 (suggesting that O'Connell's no-fault plan
will be particularly attractive to high-risk drivers and drivers of heavy vehicles who im-
pose more risk on others than on themselves).
57. This would be less expensive than the tort system because the motorist, by elect-
ing no-fault, avoids all liability for the nonpecuniary losses of others.
58. Efficient tort liability and damage rules governing automobile accidents are dis-
cussed in more detail in Arlen, supra note 31 (discussing the importance of distinguish-
ing between unilateral risk and bilateral risk accidents); Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra
note I (same); see also Michelle J. White, An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contribu-
tory Negligence Rules in Accident Law, 20 RAND J. ECON. 308 (1989).
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mobile accidents has established that negligence liability5" is capa-
ble of inducing motorists to take the efficient level of care, because
each motorist recognizes that if she fails to take due care and is in-
volved in an accident she will bear both her own costs and those of
the other person, if the other person took due care. Accordingly, a
negligence liability rule forces each motorist to internalize the full
social cost of failing to take due care.6o Moreover, negligence has a
beneficial effect on each motorist's caretaking even though motor-
ists generally are insured. Automobile insurance premiums gener-
ally are experience-rated, and moreover, automobile policies
generally include deductibles and policy limits, all of which force
motorists to bear some of the costs to others of their negligent
behavior.6"
Negligence liability does have its limits, however, even in an
ideal world. Specifically, negligence liability rules do not induce ef-
ficient activity levels because motorists who take due care do not
bear the costs they impose on others each time they drive. Accord-
ingly, motorists do not consider the full social costs of the activity in
determining their driving frequency. 2 Negligence liability nonethe-
less does reduce activity levels below what they would be in the ab-
sence of any tort liability, and thus moves them toward the efficient
level. Under negligence liability, each motorist recognizes that she
sometimes will be liable to others for their injuries.13 Because in-
59. Throughout this section, "negligence liability" will be used to refer to both pure
negligence liability and negligence with contributory negligence.
60. See Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra note 1, at 78-81, 97-100; Arlen, supra note 31,
at 415-16. Negligence liability will induce efficient caretaking even if the damage award
is less than the full social cost of the risk. All that is necessary for efficient caretaking is
that the damage award equal (or exceed) the additional cost to the motorist of taking
due care divided by the probability of an accident. See Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra
note 1, at 100-03.
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clash of Two Cultures: Will the Tort System Survive
Automobile Insurance Reform?, 25 VAL. U.L. REV. 173, 181 (1991); Schwartz, supra note 17,
at 320-21; see generally SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 206-15. The relationship between in-
surance and deterrence is discussed in more detail above. See supra note 31 and accom-
panying text. For additional arguments why we should expect tort law for automobile
accidents to provide motorists with incentives to create fewer risks notwithstanding the
presence of third-party insurance, see Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 30-33.
62. JENNIFER ARLEN, LIABILITY RULES AND ACTIVITY LEVELS WHEN INJURERS AS WELL
AS VICTIMS SUFFER LOSSES 8 (Emory University Law and Economics Working Paper No.
37, 1992); see also Brian Hindley & Bill Bishop, Accident Liability Rules and Externality, 3
INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 59, 60-61 (1983).
63. The economic analysis of negligence appears to imply that individuals will never
be negligent. Yet we observe negligent behavior all the time. See ChristopherJ. Bruce,
The Deterrent Effects ofAutomobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6
LAW & POL'y 67, 69 (1984) (noting that a United States study of 352 automobile accident
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surance premiums are experience-rated, each motorist treats this
expected liability to others as a cost of engaging in the activity, as
any actual liability she incurs translates directly into higher premi-
ums.' 4 Accordingly, under a negligence liability rule, the cost to
each motorist of driving is closer to the actual social cost of the ac-
tivity than it would be in the absence of tort liability, and thus each
motorist's activity level is closer to the efficient level.
In addition, negligence liability with experience-rated premi-
ums has a beneficial impact on activity levels by reducing the
number of inefficient-that is, overly risky-motorists below the
level that would prevail in the absence of tort liability. In deciding
whether to drive, each motorist treats her expected premiums as a
cost of the activity. To the extent that premiums force each motorist
to bear some of the costs she imposes on others, in addition to her
own costs, insurance premiums reduce the number of motorists on
the road for whom the benefits of driving are less than the expected
social costs. Premiums, in other words, provide socially desirable
incentives for high-cost motorists to refrain from driving.65 Accord-
insurance claims found that 90% involved uncontroverted evidence of fault); see Dewees
& Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 65. One explanation for this, offered by Mark Grady, is
that the legal standard for negligence focuses on the action the motorist actually took,
not the underlying attention level necessary to ensure that the proper care is taken.
Accordingly, an individual's actual care-in the sense of the level of attention devoted to
taking due care-under a negligence rule might be efficient, and yet the person might in
fact behave negligently because of momentary (but efficient) inadvertence. See Mark F.
Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malprac-
tice Explosion, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 293, 306 (1988); see also Schwartz, supra note 17, at 347.
In this case, individuals can expect to incur some tort liability even though their level of
care (as properly defined) is efficient.
64. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 320-21; see discussion infra note 65.
65. See Epstein, supra note 61, at 181 (arguing that liability insurance does not elimi-
nate the beneficial effect of the tort system on motorists' activity levels); cf. infra note 71
(discussing the impact of higher costs on the poor). It might appear that negligence will
not increase the motorist's costs of engaging the activity because, although she will
sometimes be liable for injuries caused to another, in some cases the other driver will
have been negligent and will have to pay for her costs. This is not the case in physical
injury cases. Each motorist recognizes that in automobile accidents sometimes only one
party will suffer a serious physical injury, or, for other reasons, only one will be liable
and the other will not. Accordingly, each motorist recognizes that there will be circum-
stances where she will face a positive net liability for the losses of another. Given this,
consider the motorists' insurance costs. Were there no tort liability she would only in-
sure against her pecuniary losses because her expected utility is higher if she does not
insure against nonpecuniary losses. Under current tort law, however, her expected pe-
cuniary losses include her expected liability for the other motorist's nonpecuniary
losses. In other words, tort law transforms the nonpecuniary loss component of a physi-
cal injury into a pecuniary loss, which a rational motorist will insure against, paying the
premium out of wealth which otherwise would be available to her when healthy. In
return for these increased costs, the motorist knows that she sometimes will be compen-
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ingly, both the number of motorists and the frequency with which
each motorist drives are closer to the social optimum under a negli-
gence liability rule than it would be were there no tort liability.
B. Analysis of O'Connell's No-Fault Proposal
We now are in a position to consider the proposed no-fault sys-
tem. The new no-fault proposal would, in effect, eliminate tort lia-
bility for automobile accidents and substitute a system of first-party
insurance under which victims would only recover their pecuniary
losses.66 This system would have the desirable effects of reducing
administrative costs and rationalizing victim compensation. The
cost of adopting this system, however, would be significant: adopt-
ing this proposal would decrease motorists' incentive to reduce risk,
thereby increasing accident costs. Moreover, it does not appear to
be possible to improve the deterrent effects of this compensation
system without eliminating its core characteristic of no-fault first-
party insurance.
The central problem with the proposal is that it would effec-
tively eliminate each motorist's liability for other motorists' accident
costs. As a result, motorists governed by the new system would take
insufficient care, leading to increased expected accident costs. 67 In
addition, and perhaps of greater significance, replacing negligence
liability with no-fault liability would lead to greater activity levels
because it would lower insurance premiums: both the number of
motorists and the frequency with which each motorist drives could
be expected to increase.6" Given that, under negligence, liability ac-
tivity levels are too high, the increase in activity levels brought about
by replacing negligence liability with the proposed no-fault system
sated by the other if injured. Yet, given our assumption that the motorist would not
have insured against the nonpecuniary component of the injury were she to suffer it
herself, we know that on average the expected cost of the increased premium associated
with negligence liability exceeds the expected benefit of any compensation the motorist
might receive if injured. See infra Appendix (proving this claim). Accordingly, the total
expected cost to each individual of becoming a motorist is higher under a negligence
rule than it is in the absence of tort liability, and thus activity levels are lower. Given that
activity levels would be too high if motorists do not face tort liability because the ex-
pected cost of the activity is too low, this increase in the cost of the activity resulting
from the use of a negligence liability rule results in a more efficient activity level,
although it still will exceed the efficient activity level. See supra text accompanying notes
62-65.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
67. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1035-36.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65. This conclusion is confirmed by the
RAND study that the authors rely on in their article.
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clearly would be undesirable.6 9 The resulting increase in expected
accident costs must be treated as a cost of adopting the O'Connell
and Horowitz plan.7" The proposed no-fault plan should be re-
jected as too costly if the resulting increase in expected accident
cost exceeds the resulting reduction in administrative costs. 7'
The authors of the "choice" no-fault proposal do not consider
the impact of their system on expected accident costs in the empiri-
cal analysis of their plan, however. This is a surprising-and criti-
cal--omission. The authors argue that they do not have to consider
the effect of no-fault on accident rates because tort liability has no
deterrent effect. The empirical evidence does not support this
claim, however, but rather demonstrates that adopting the new no-
fault plan would increase expected accident costs. The best evi-
dence on this issue comes from Quebec which, in the 1970s, re-
placed tort liability for automobile accidents with a system of no-
fault insurance.72 One analysis of the effects of the Quebec scheme
69. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65; accord Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 30
(suggesting that movement to a first-party no-fault system is unlikely to entail any reduc-
tion in safety); see also Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1039-42 (criticizing the impact of
no-fault on deterrence). But see Richard A. Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second
Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769, 785-86 (1980) (shifting from negli-
gence to no-fault is likely to have little effect on incentives to create risk). Moreover, the
individuals whose activity level would be most likely to increase as a result of adopting
the O'Connell plan are those motorists who impose more risk on others than they bear
themselves: the high-risk drivers and the drivers of heavy vehicles such as trucks. See
Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 52.
70. The RAND study, on which Professor O'Connell relies, does not examine the
effect of no-fault on expected accident costs in its analysis of whether no-fault will re-
duce costs. Thus, the RAND study does not address the question of whether no-fault
will reduce total social costs.
71. The proposed no-fault plan would appear to have some desirable distributional
effects which warrant consideration. Among the people most likely to be dissuaded
from driving by a policy favoring greater cost internalization are young urban motorists,
who are both less-experienced drivers and driving in more risky areas, and thus are
likely to have more accidents. Higher expected liability, accordingly, will discourage
many poorer young urban motorists from driving, a disproportionate number of whom
will be minorities. In many cities a person who does not own a car is seriously disadvan-
taged in the job market, however. The impact of insurance on poor young urban drivers
accordingly should concern us. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND
THE LAw 33-34 (1985). This observation, however, is not in itself a valid criticism of tort
liability. Eliminating tort liability is not the best way to assist poor young urban motor-
ists, because it would have too many other undesirable effects. A far better approach
would be to retain the deterrent effects of the tort system and find a more direct way to
aid those drivers who society decides are in special need of assistance-for example, by
providing government subsidized insurance for poor motorists who maintain good driv-
ing records.
72. For a description of the Quebec system, see Jeffrey O'Connell & Charles Tenser,
North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebecs Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
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found that bodily injury accidents increased by 26.3 percent a year
after the adoption of the scheme, and fatalities increased by 6.8 per-
cent.7" This report attributed the increase in injuries and fatalities
in significant part to the impact of no-fault on activity levels: specifi-
cally, the increase in the number of high-risk drivers resulting from
the dramatic reduction in the cost of their automobile insurance.74
The conclusion that Quebec's no-fault plan led to an increase in fa-
talities was confirmed by a subsequent study, which concluded that
the increase in fatalities could be attributed to both the reduction in
motorists' care levels and the increase in activity levels resulting
from the adoption of no-fault.75 These studies confirmed that no-
fault increases expected accident costs-notwithstanding the fact
that no-fault does reduce the number of uninsured drivers on the
road.7 6 The empirical evidence, accordingly, supports the claim of
the present analysis that adopting the "choice" no-fault plan will
increase expected accident costs.
Professor O'Connell and his co-authors claim that they need
not consider deterrence concerns because the proper goal of a no-
fault system is to provide compensation for victims; the goal of de-
terring risk should be left to government regulation. This argu-
ment, however, is not persuasive. First, introducing a no-fault
system cannot be justified as a means of providing compensation to
injured victims: if victim compensation is an important social goal,
there is no particular reason why victims of highway accidents
should receive special treatment. 77 Additionally, deterrence con-
REV. 917 (1987). For a review of the empirical evidence on no-fault in the United States,
New Zealand, and Canada, see Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 28-33.
73. Marc Gaudry, The Effects on Road Safety of the Compulsory Insurance, Flat Premium
Rating and No-Fault Features of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Act, in REPORT OF THE INQUIRY
INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN ONTARIO app. (Ontario: Queen's
Printer 1988). See also Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 28-33 (discussing Gaudry's analysis).
74. Gaudry, supra note 73. In a subsequent study, Gaudry confirmed his finding that
the no-fault system in Quebec led to an increase in road accidents, but concluded that it
was not possible to determine whether this increase was caused by the compulsory insur-
ance requirement and the provision of flat insurance rates (not experience-rated premi-
ums)-both of which reduce incentives to exercise care-or by the elimination of the
tort system. Marc Gaudry, Measuring the Effects of the No-Fault 1978 Quebec Automobile Insur-
ance Act with the DRAG Model, in GEORGES DIONNE, CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECo-
NOMICs 417, 494 (1992).
75. Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Accident Insurance Regimes: An
Analysis of the Experience in Quebec, in DIONNE, supra note 74, at 499; see also Rose Anne
Devlin, Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
193 (1990).
76. See Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 28-33.
77. See Epstein, supra note 69, at 788. See supra note 71 (discussing possible solutions
to the impact of tort liability on the poor).
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cerns cannot be ignored because government regulation is not nec-
essarily an effective mechanism for deterring risk. In general, and
for the reasons discussed above, there is no reason to expect that
government action will be efficient. 78 Moreover, regulation is a par-
ticularly poor substitute for liability in the case of automobile acci-
dents. It is difficult to control care levels of drivers in advance,
making ex ante regulation of care virtually impossible; and ex post reg-
ulation through criminal prosecutions is not as effective as ex post
regulation through civil liability, largely because civil actions are
more likely to be brought.79
Accordingly, both a theoretical economic analysis and the ex-
isting empirical evidence suggest that we should expect a switch
from the present system to the proposed no-fault system to result in
an increase in the number of accidents because (i) the number of
drivers will increase, (ii) the frequency of driving will increase, and
(iii) the drivers on the road can be expected to use less care than
under a negligence system. This is a significant cost that must be
taken into account before deciding whether to adopt such a system.
In determining whether the new no-fault proposal should be
adopted, it must be acknowledged that the system has significant
benefits-lower administrative costs being the most notable. The
question is whether the costs of the system exceed the benefits.
This is a question that, at present, the proponents of the system are
not in a position to answer because their analysis ignores the effect
of their system on expected accident costs. Accordingly, prudence
dictates that this proposal should not be implemented until its costs
and benefits have been fully analyzed. Should empirical analysis re-
veal that the new no-fault system's costs exceed its benefits, it
should not be implemented-even though failing to implement the
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
79. See Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1041. This conclusion is consistent with the
available empirical evidence on the effects of criminal and regulatory alternatives to the
tort system. This evidence suggests that most of these regulations-with the exception
of mandatory seatbelt laws, highway design measures, and car design-have had little
effect on the traffic accident rate. See Dewees & Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 74-77; see
also Epstein, supra note 69, at 787 (arguing that criminal laws governing motorists are
not adequately enforced, and consequently, tort liability provides valuable additional
incentives to reduce risk); Adam Gelb, Georgia s Drunk Driving Scandal: The State Can't Get
Drunks Off the Road, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Nov. 3, 1991, at AI (noting that despite strin-
gent drunk driving laws, Georgia has tens of thousands of repeat offenders, and that
judges do not take away drivers' licenses even when the driver has 15 drunk-driving
convictions).
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proposal means living with high insurance rates.8 0 High insurance
rates reflect, in large part, the enormous costs to society of driving
an automobile; reducing insurance rates at the expense of increas-
ing the accident rate is not desirable. Should society conclude that
for some people-for example, the poor-current insurance rates
impose an undue burden, this problem can better be remedied by
programs aimed specifically at low-income drivers, than by a general
reduction in liability that disproportionately benefits high-risk
drivers.8'
III. INJURIES TO CUSTOMERS AND WORKERS
Tort liability generally, and recovery for nonpecuniary losses in
particular, stands on a very different footing when we shift our focus
from accidents between strangers to accidents between people who
80. Should we chose to rely on negligence liability rules to govern automobile acci-
dents, the rules governing the defendant's liability and the victim's recovery would need
to be reformed. If negligence rules function perfectly, then the optimal system would
base damage awards on the amount necessary to induce efficient deterrence-which,
under a negligence rule, implies that recovery should be based on the cost of taking due
care (divided by the probability of being held liable), and not on the cost to an individual
victim of being injured. See Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra note 1, at 100-03. If driver
inadvertence is a serious issue, however, and negligence liability in effect functions as a
rule of strict liability, see Arlen, supra note 31, at 418-19, then the damage award should
be based on the social cost of the risks each motorist imposes on others, not on the cost
of care. A social cost-of-harm award also would be preferable from the standpoint of
reducing motorists' activity levels toward the efficient level. Moreover, neither award
would depend on the individual characteristics of any particular victim, and thus, would
not be subject to the same problems of fraud and abuse that Professor Schwartz has
found currently plagues nonpecuniary loss awards under compensation systems. See
Schwartz, supra note 43.
Whichever award is used, the damage award could be greater than or less than any
given victim's pecuniary loss, which presents the possibility that damage awards will pre-
clude efficient risk-spreading by victims. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35 . In
the bilateral risk context, however, this possibility is less likely than it might first appear,
because under negligence liability for bilateral risks the damage award that effects care-
taking decisions exceeds the award that affects risk-spreading decisions. Accordingly, in
the bilateral risk context, it may be possible to induce both efficient caretaking and effi-
cient risk-spreading. See Arlen, supra note 31, at 422-24 (presenting this analysis in de-
tail). Moreover, it is possible to provide optimal incentives by providing the victim with
compensation (net of costs) equal to her pecuniary losses, and having the defendant pay
an additional amount to the state (which could be used to improve roads or to provide
compensation for indigent victims). See, e.g., Michael Spence, Consumer .1Iisperceptions,
Product Failure and Product Liability, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977) (suggesting this ap-
proach); Polinsky & Che, supra note 33, at 563 (same); SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 233
(same); but see supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
81. See supra note 71. Similarly, a possible partial solution to the uninsured motorist
problem is to increase the costs of being uninsured by increasing the resulting fines and
by precluding those motorists who drive without insurance from seeking tort recovery
from other motorists.
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have a consensual, or market, relationship-such as doctor-patient,
manufacturer-consumer or employer-employee. Accordingly, the
legitimacy of compensation systems in "nonstranger" cases-such
as Professor Rabin's compensation system as applied to mass prod-
uct-related torts-must be analyzed separately from proposals for
compensation systems for injuries resulting from accidents between
strangers.
The present analysis reveals that there is much to recommend
in Professor Rabin's proposal to consider bringing products liability
cases under an administrative compensation scheme. Professor Ra-
bin's compensation system would lower administrative costs. More-
over, limiting each victim's recovery to her pecuniary losses would
promote efficient risk-spreading by victims. The central problem
with Professor Rabin's proposal as applied to product-related inju-
ries, however, is that it is not designed to provide producers with
efficient incentives to reduce risk. Professor Rabin's system does
not ensure that producers' financial contributions to the compensa-
tion system on the risks they create: initially, producers' contribu-
tions would not be experience-related, and basing contributions on
expected liability to victims will not provide adequate incentives to
reduce risk. Furthermore, Professor Rabin does not address the im-
pact of liability on producers' incentives to obtain, and to reveal,
information about product risks. Given that this may be the most
important impact of the tort system on product markets, we should
be reluctant to adopt any proposal before the impact of liability on
information acquisition and dissemination has been addressed.
A. Mass Tort Recovery as an Insurance Market
Operating on the assumption that tort liability does not effec-
tively deter the risks of mass torts, Professor Rabin has designed his
system around the goal of victim compensation. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Rabin's argument that deterrence does not matter is consis-
tent with some of the economic analysis of products liability
literature, although he has his own reasons for rejecting deterrence
concerns. Economic analysis suggests that, in certain circum-
stances, deterrence is not a valid concern of products liability law
because market forces will ensure both that manufacturers engage
in optimal care in manufacturing their products and that the activity
level (the quantity produced) is efficient.8 2 This literature con-
82. A manufacturer that produces a product which imposes risk on its purchasers
will take into account the cost to consumers of this risk even if it is not liable in tort for
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cludes, as does Professor Rabin, that the central function of al-
lowing victims to recover for product-related injuries is to provide
them with compensation. This compensation is best viewed as a
mandatory insurance policy because manufacturers pass their ex-
pected liability costs on to consumers in the form of higher product
prices.
Ironically, eliminating deterrence as a central goal of allowing
recovery for product-related injuries effectively eliminates the most
persuasive argument for allowing such recovery: absent a deter-
rence rationale, both products liability and a mass tort compensa-
tion system are very difficult to justify. First, if Professor Rabin's
goal is simply to compensate victims by providing them with
mandatory insurance, there is no particular reason to set up an elab-
orate compensation system. Most potential victims can purchase
first-party insurance against such losses, and a general system of so-
cial insurance could take care of the rest. This system would, argua-
bly, be more equitable than the one proposed by Professor Rabin
because it would not favor victims of product-related injuries over
other victims, and it might well be less expensive because the ad-
ministrative costs of first-party insurance are considerably lower
than the administrative costs of a compensation system.83 Accord-
ingly, a mass tort compensation system-and products liability-can
be justified on compensation grounds alone only if it can be shown
that the system is a significantly more effective mechanism for pro-
viding insurance than is either first-party insurance or a broader
government-provided social insurance policy. This is not the case.
Previous analysis of this issue reveals that products liability is
not a good mechanism for providing insurance.84 Most of the
problems with products liability as an insurance market also would
consumers' losses, as long as consumers are perfectly informed and rational. This is
because the consumers will treat the risks of the product as part of the effective product
price. Accordingly, in an effort to minimize the cost of the product, manufacturers will
take the efficient level of care. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 5-46. Similarly,
market forces will result in the manufacturer engaging in the efficient level of the activ-
ity. This is because each consumer will consider the effective cost of the product price to
be the actual product price plus his expected accident losses associated with the product.
All those consumers whose willingness-to-pay exceeds this amount will purchase the
product; those who do not derive sufficient benefit from the product will not. Thus,
market forces will result in efficient activity levels. See id. See infra text accompanying
notes 92-117 (discussing efficient deterrence when markets are not perfect).
83. See Weiler, supra note 5, at 925-926 (noting that first-party health insurance
spends between 5 and 10 cents of each claim dollar on administration, whereas no-fault
workers' compensation spends roughly 20 cents of each claim dollar on administration).
84. This issue has been analyzed in detail elsewhere, and thus will not be discussed
in great depth here. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 18, at 170-72; Richard A. Epstein,
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plague an administrative compensation scheme designed to provide
insurance. For example, one justification for providing mandatory
insurance through a compensation system is that consumers may
underestimate the risk of accident.8 5 In this situation, potential vic-
tims faced with accurately priced insurance coverage may well view
the price of insurance as too high, because they perceive their ex-
pected accident losses to be less than they are in fact.8 6 This prob-
lem, to the extent it exists," is not eliminated by providing
mandatory insurance through a compensation system, however.
Any consumer who would refrain from purchasing first-party insur-
ance because she underestimates the product risk-and therefore
overestimates the cost of the coverage-also would overestimate the
cost of the insurance component of the product price under a com-
pensation system. Accordingly, the demand for the product still
would be below the efficient level.
Moreover, Professor Rabin's system would only exacerbate the
market distortions produced by mandatory insurance because,
under his system, manufacturers' liability to the system is not based
on the expected social cost of the product's risk. Initially, under his
system, each manufacturer will be assessed a flat amount. Under
such a system, the "insurance premium" component of the price of
many lower-risk products would exceed the premium justified by the
resulting expected accident costs. Similarly, the "insurance pre-
mium," and thus the product price, of high-risk products would be
Products Liability As An Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 669 (1985); Priest, supra
note 29, at 1525.
85. Imperfect consumer risk-perception is not the only problem plaguing insurance
markets. Two other problems with first-party insurance are "adverse selection" and
"moral hazard." Providing mandatory insurance through either the tort system or
through a compensation system does not eliminate these problems, however, but only
exacerbates them. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of adverse selection and
moral hazard on the effectiveness of products liability as an insurance market see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
475, 495-506 (1984); Priest, supra note 29, at 1553-63; see also Janusz A. Ordover, Prod-
ucts Liability in Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 519 (1979)
(considering the problem of selection of liability rules when consumers of a product
differ with respect to some relevant characteristic). In fact, the moral hazard problem-
that potential victims fail to exercise due care if they are fully insured because they bear
all the costs of care and receive none of the benefits-would be heightened under Pro-
fessor Rabin's compensation system because his proposal would eliminate the last ves-
tiges of contributory negligence as a defense.
86. See Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1033 n.22.
87. The psychological evidence on risk perceptions suggests that people may over-
or under-estimate risk of injury to themselves. Viscusi, supra note 18, at 64-65; Dewees
& Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 67; see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
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too low. Accordingly, consumers would buy less than the efficient
amount of low-risk products and more than the efficient number of
high-risk products. The compensation system would, consequently,
undermine the efficiency of the product market, resulting in too
many high-risk products. The other problems associated with first-
party insurance-for example, moral hazard and adverse selection-
also would plague Professor Rabin's compensation system.88
Furthermore, the case against both products liability and mass
tort compensation systems as mechanisms for providing victims with
insurance becomes even stronger once the special features of insur-
ance for mass product-related torts are considered. Many mass tort
product-related injuries involve risks that were unforeseen at the
time the product was made, as well as long latency periods between
the time of exposure and the time of injury. This uncertainty makes
it difficult to determine the proper amount to charge for "insur-
ance" under either the tort system or Rabin's compensation system.
Either overcharging or undercharging for the insurance provided by
the manufacturer will distort the market for the product and lead to
an inefficient activity level. Moreover, the long latency period may
lead to a breakdown of the market altogether: a long lag between
the time at which the premium is paid and the time at which the risk
is realized may sever the link between the product price and the in-
surance provided to such an extent that the products liability (or
compensation system) insurance market will not be viable. A manu-
facturer may not have sufficient information to charge the original
consumers the correct amount to cover its costs; it cannot charge
current consumers an extra sum to cover its liability to the earlier
consumers because current consumers will not be willing to pay for
insurance provided to someone else.8 9 By contrast, long latency pe-
riods will not create the same problem for first-party insurance mar-
kets because each year the potential victim purchases insurance for
injuries that may occur during that year. Accordingly, both poten-
tial victims and the insurance company need only be able to estimate
the victim's risk of injury for that next year. As information about a
product's risks becomes known, both potential victims and the in-
surance company will be better able to price the value of insurance
coverage against that risk.9 ° Accordingly, first-party insurance, with
88. See supra note 85; see also infra note 90.
89. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 18, at 158-60.
90. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 18, at 158-60; Rabin, supra note 3, at 977. In addi-
tion, a critical element of a functioning insurance market is that the risk the insurer has
insured must be independent. Insurers are able to stay in business by collecting premi-
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all its problems, may be preferable to both products liability and
compensation systems as a mechanism for compensating victims. 9'
The case for a mass tort compensation system-to the extent one
can be made-must be based, therefore, on the premise that deter-
rence is a central goal of such a system, and the system must be
designed to serve this goal.
B. Mass Tort Recovery and Deterrence
Manufacturer liability to a compensation system in fact may be
justified as a method of efficiently deterring risk creation. Although,
in theory, market forces provide manufacturers with efficient incen-
tives to reduce risk when consumers are perfectly informed and per-
fectly rational, markets will not provide manufacturers with the
proper incentives to reduce product risks when consumers are unin-
formed about the risks or do not properly perceive the risks they
have been informed about. In these situations, manufacturer liabil-
ity-either through a compensation system or through products lia-
bility-may be justified on deterrence grounds in order to induce
manufacturers to inform consumers optimally about product risks
and/or to circumvent the market failure resulting from consumer
misperceptions of product risks. Employing a compensation system
to provide manufacturers with efficient incentives to reveal, and/or
reduce, product risks would, however, require a number of impor-
tant changes in Professor Rabin's proposal. Designing a compensa-
tion system properly also would require considerably greater
understanding of product (and information) markets than exists at
present.
For markets to function effectively, consumers must be fully in-
ums from many different people on the expectation that not all of them will be injured.
Thus, not all insureds will collect. In the products liability context, however, the losses
produced by product failure often are not independent. For example, in the case of a
drug, the risk of most concern to a manufacturer is that, over time, the manufacturer will
discover that the drug caused serious injury to some of its consumers. This is not an
independent risk. If this risk is not realized, no consumers will require compensation. If
it is realized, then hundreds of the drug's consumers may require compensation, if not
all of them. In this situation, the "premiums" collected may well be insufficient to cover
the expected losses. To avoid this problem, the manufacturer will have to purchase
insurance, thereby introducing an additional level of administrative costs. See Epstein,
supra note 84, at 649-50 (discussing the concept of risk diversification). First-party in-
surance by customers is preferable in this context.
91. To the extent that some people cannot afford insurance, providing low-income
persons with government-funded coverage might well be preferable to implementing a
compensation system that provides all people with mandatory insurance, but only for
products-related injuries.
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formed of product risks.92 This in turn requires that products be
tested properly to determine the specific risks associated with each
product,93 and that consumers be informed about material product
risks-both risks that the manufacturer knew at the time of sale and
risks that the manufacturer learns of after the sale. Markets alone
may not be sufficient to provide these incentives, however. Manu-
facturers may not have adequate incentives to discover and reveal
product risks if they expect that consumers do not know the possible
risks and will not discover the risks on their own.9 4 Manufacturers
do not benefit from proving that their product is free from a risk-if
indeed it is-if consumers do not expect the product to be risky in
the first place.95 Accordingly, imposing liability on manufacturers
may be necessary to provide them with the requisite incentives to
test products properly and to reveal to consumers information
about the risks of products currently on the market as that informa-
tion becomes available.96
92. It is not necessary that all consumers be perfectly informed in order for markets
to provide the right incentives. What is necessary is that the marginal consumers-those
that determine the market clearing price-be fully informed.
93. Efficiency does not require that products be tested for every possible risk. Test-
ing should be done when the expected benefit of the test (in terms of the probability of
finding a risk and the expected injuries prevented as a result) equals or exceeds the
expected cost of the test.
94. The current debate over whether certain products-e.g., Bendectin, DES, Breast
Implants, Agent Orange, pesticides-harm consumers, and if so, what harm and to
which persons, provides some insight into how difficult it may be to accurately attribute
a victim's injury to the proper causal source. Cf. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
95. The expectation that consumers will not learn of the risk over time also mutes
market incentives to the extent that reputational concerns might otherwise cause a firm
to test its products to ensure that they do not present unnecessary risks.
96. See Walter Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 26
(1973) (suggesting that consumers cannot get enough product information because sell-
ers lack incentives to produce such information). It might appear that determining
which risks to test for, and reveal, is a task better performed by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and other regulatory agencies. These agencies cannot be relied
on to provide the requisite incentives to obtain information about risks, however, be-
cause regulators are subject to capture. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46. The
costs of relying on regulatory agencies to control product risks are particularly great for
those who are not members of an effective interest group-women, fetuses, infants,
Blacks, and American Indians. For example, although the FDA requires pharmaceutical
companies to test their drugs extensively before they are marketed, the FDA generally
has not challenged the industry's practice of excluding women of child-bearing age from
most drug trials, even when the drugs-such as common heart medications-will even-
tually be marketed to such women. For years, Lupron was widely prescribed to treat
infertile women even though the only safety studies had been conducted on men with
prostate cancer. To date, the National Institutes of Health have commissioned only one
drug trial on women, and that study was expressly designed to examine only post-meno-
pausal women. Similarly, infants and minorities are not adequately protected by the cur-
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To provide the requisite incentives to test products and reveal
information, however, a compensation system must be designed
with this goal in mind. Professor Rabin has not attempted to do
this, perhaps in part because at this point far too little is known
about the effects of liability on information acquisition and dissemi-
nation to serve as the basis for designing an efficient system.97 But
this lack of information in and of itself suggests that it may not be
desirable to implement a mass tort compensation system at
present.98
Moreover, the analysis that has been done suggests that a cen-
tral feature of Rabin's system-the provision of absolute manufac-
turer liability-may be inconsistent with providing manufacturers
with efficient incentives to reveal information. Specifically, absolute
liability may undermine manufacturers' incentives to warn consum-
ers about risks the manufacturer discovers after the product has
been marketed. 9 Under a compensation system based on absolute
liability, warning consumers of product risks has two opposing ef-
fects on a manufacturer's expected costs. On the one hand, warning
future consumers of product risks reduces a manufacturer's ex-
pected liability-that is, future premiums-by reducing the ex-
pected number of consumers who will use the product. On the
other hand, issuing a warning may increase the manufacturer's ex-
pected liability by increasing the number of existing consumers who
rent federal drug regulation. See ROBERT L. HOTZ, DESIGNS ON LIFE (1991); Robert L.
Hotz, A Risky Fertility Revolution, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 27, 1991, at D1. Given the
federal government's reluctance to even obtain the appropriate data on the risk of prod-
ucts for members of various groups, the threat of tort liability may serve as a crucial
incentive for companies to conduct the necessary tests and issue the appropriate warn-
ings. Arlen, supra note 39, at 2171-72; cf. Dewees & Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 101-04
(arguing that the empirical evidence suggests that regulation has not proven to be an
effective way to reduce product-related injuries).
97. Among the only articles to address the issue of the impact of liability on incen-
tives to obtain and reveal information about risk include SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 77-
79, 93; Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances
and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 695-705 (1985); Steven Shavell,
Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992); see
also Jennifer Arlen, When Should Corporations Be Criminally Liable, 23J. LEGAL STUD. (forth-
coming 1994) (examining the impact of strict criminal liability on corporations' incen-
tives to learn about crimes committed by their employees); Richard Craswell,
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988);
Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365
(1989).
98. See supra note 12.
99. For example, manufacturers may learn of these risks through law suits. Also,
pharmaceutical manufacturers may learn about risks through reports to them (and to the
FDA) by doctors about side-effects that doctors notice in their patients.
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file claims with the compensation system because, without the warn-
ing, some consumers would not discover that their illness resulted
from their use of the product.' 0 Similarly, some consumers whose
illness did not result from the product may successfully use the
warning (and admission of risk) as evidence that the product pro-
duced their harm.' 0 ' If this latter effect is sufficiently strong, manu-
facturers may decide not to reveal information of product risks as
they learn of it in an attempt to avoid liability-thereby increasing
the amount of harm produced by the product.10 2 If this should
prove to be a serious concern, Professor Rabin should evaluate the
merits of employing a more fault-based standard, under which man-
ufacturers are not liable to any consumers who purchased the prod-
uct after the manufacturer issued an adequate warning (provided
the product had been adequately tested).0 3 Certainly, more atten-
tion should be given to the question of whether Rabin's system will
provide manufacturers with the requisite incentives to test products
and reveal information about risks before any attempt is made to
implement a mass toxic tort compensation system.' 0 4
Providing manufacturers with incentives to discover and reveal
information about product risks is not the only way in which manu-
facturer liability may promote efficient deterrence. Manufacturer li-
ability also may be necessary to induce efficient deterrence when
product risks are known if the market does not function properly
because consumers misperceive the risks. 10 5 Empirical evidence
suggests that consumers do not always properly evaluate known
risks, and in fact underestimate certain risks, particularly those of
ioo. Cf. Arlen, supra note 97. This effect will be particularly strong if the manufac-
turer can reasonably expect that some previously valid claims will not be valid after the
passage of a sufficient period of time-for example, because the statute of limitations
may run.
101. See Calfee & Rubin, supra note 29, at 392-98 (discussing the problem of liability
for risky products that reduce the risk of disease).
102. Cf. Arlen, supra note 97.
103. Of course, this problem could be eliminated by using a system in which insur-
ance is not experience-rated. This is not a desirable solution, however, because insur-
ance that is not experience-rated undermines manufacturer's incentives to take efficient
care in producing their products, and results in consumers being charged a product
price which does not correspond to the product's costs, thereby resulting in inefficient
activity levels. See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.
104. See supra notes 96, 97.
105. See, e.g., Victor Goldberg, The Economics of Product Safety and Impetfect Information, 5
BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 683 (1974); Oi, supra note 96 (justifying enterprise liability
based on systemic consumer misperceptions); Spence, supra note 80 (same).
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more common injuries.' 0 6 When consumers underestimate a prod-
uct's risks, they will underestimate the full cost to them of purchas-
ing the product. Accordingly, if manufacturers are not liable,
consumers will purchase too much of the product; this excessive ac-
tivity level in turn leads to excessive risk.' 1 7 Under these circum-
stances, imposing absolute liability on manufacturers promotes
efficient deterrence because manufacturers will include their ex-
pected liability in the product price. If the manufacturer's expected
liability equals the expected social cost of the risks created by each
product, the product price will equal the total social cost of the
product (including the product's risk) and consumers will make the
correct decision about how much of the product to purchase. The
activity level therefore will be efficient.' 08
The liability system that induces efficient activity levels differs in
significant respects from the one proposed by Professor Rabin, how-
ever. Inducing efficient behavior thus would require amendments
to Rabin's proposal.' 0 9 Most important, Professor Rabin argues
that manufacturer liability generally should be limited to the victim's
pecuniary losses. Yet to induce manufacturers to produce the effi-
cient amount of the product, each manufacturer's liability must
equal the expected social cost of the risk it creates." 0 As previously
106. Studies show that people have a tendency to overestimate the low-probability
events and underestimate larger risks. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 64. For example,
people tend to underestimate more-common risks-such as the risk of dying from heart
disease, stroke or cancer-and overestimate greatly the risks of being hit by lightening
or killed in a tornado. Id.
107. See Spence, supra note 80. Imperfect information also may cause manufacturers
to not take the efficient level of care if consumers misperceive the effect of changes in
care on the product's quality (riskiness). Imposing liability on the manufacturer will not
necessarily correct this problem. See Schwartz, supra note 97.
108. Shavell, supra note 14; but see Calfee & Rubin, supra note 29, at 392-98 (discussing
efficient compensation for product-related injuries resulting from products that reduce
the victim's risk of death). Under certain conditions, liability rules also will induce man-
ufacturers to take the efficient level of care. Id.; see supra note 107 (discussing the impact
of imperfect information on care levels). Caretaking will not necessarily be efficient,
however, if consumers differ in their preferences for risk and manufacturers cannot dis-
tinguish between consumers of different types. See Oi. supra note 96; Ordover, supra
note 85, at 505.
109. One might object by arguing that regulation is a better way of deterring product
risk. This argument is subject to all the standard criticisms of proposals to rely on gov-
ernment regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46; see supra note 95.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. But see Calfee & Rubin, supra note 29,
at 392-98 (discussing efficient compensation for product-related injuries resulting from
products that reduce the victim's risk of death). This conclusion must be modified to the
extent that tort actions provide consumers with accurate information about risks. If tort
actions result in better-informed consumers-and thus more nearly efficient markets-
then inducing tort actions may induce efficient caretaking and activity levels. Once con-
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explained, this amount exceeds manufacturer liability based on vic-
tims' pecuniary losses."'
Accordingly, to provide efficient incentives, the rule on which
manufacturer's liability is based should be changed. Moreover, if
the administrative compensation scheme involves the purchase of
insurance by each manufacturer, efficiency requires that each manu-
facturer's premiums be based on expected costs." 2 As for the
amount of recovery, however, proper concern for efficient risk-
spreading suggests that each victim's recovery probably should be
limited to her pecuniary losses, as Rabin suggests." 3 If fraud and
abuse are a serious concern, however, it may be preferable to imple-
ment a recovery schedule based on expected losses, rather than bas-
ing each victim's recovery on her actual pecuniary losses.1 "'
Furthermore, the present analysis suggests that, unlike in Rabin's
system, certain products should be excluded from the system alto-
gether (unless so doing would be too costly): (1) products for which
the market appears to be functioning effectively, and (2) products
with risks that consumers are likely to overestimate significantly-
such as products with low probability of causing injury or highly
publicized risks" 5 (provided that manufacturers' care levels are not
a concern).' 16 Finally, the present analysis suggests that it may not
be possible both to provide efficient incentives to acquire and reveal
sumers are informed, market forces will induce manufacturers to take the efficient level
of care and produce the efficient amount of the product. In this situation, tort liability
would not need to force manufacturers to bear the full costs of the risks they create-at
least in those situations where we are not concerned with providing manufacturers with
additional incentives to obtain and disseminate information about product risks.
Rather, the efficient level of manufacturer liability is the level just sufficient to generate
enough tort claims to inform consumers of product risks. See PAUL RUBIN, TORT REFORM
BY CONTRACT 50 (1993). The efficient amount of manufacturer liability may exceed the
amount necessary to induce consumers to sue, however, in those situations where it is
necessary to provide manufacturers with adequate incentives to obtain and reveal infor-
mation about product risks. See supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 7-35.
112. See supra Section I; see also Viscusi, supra note 18, at 176-79 (discussing the re-
quirements for an efficient workers' compensation system); compare with Rabin, supra
note 3, at 977-78.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.
114. See supra text accompanying note 50; see also RUBIN, supra note 110, at 44-46
(discussing this problem and possible solutions). Additionally, it must be recognized
that any system where the manufacturer's expected liability per victim exceeds the vic-
tim's recovery will result in each consumer paying more for "insurance" than the
mandatory insurance is worth. This will reduce demand for the product below the effi-
cient level.
115. Cf. Viscusi, supra note 18, at 64.
116. See supra note 94.
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information and induce efficient activity levels, because absolute lia-
bility may be necessary for the latter goal but inconsistent with the
former. This tension deserves considerably more attention before
any proposal to reform the present system should be
implemented. "7
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The final compensation scheme proposal presented in this
Symposium is Paul Weiler's proposal for no-fault medical liability.
Like products liability and workplace injuries to employees, medical
malpractice cases involve victims who have a consensual or market
relationship with the injurer. The previous analysis of products lia-
bility would appear to suggest that either the market will provide
doctors with adequate incentives to take due care or that imposing
liability directly on doctors will provide the requisite incentives.
This is not the case, however. As Professor Weiler explains, the
market does not provide adequate incentives because consumers do
not know the risks associated with individual doctors and hospitals,
and cannot easily obtain that information." 8 Moreover, most pa-
tients have health and disability insurance," 9 and consequently, do
not bear the full costs of either the medical services they receive or
of the risks associated with this service. 2 ' Accordingly, market
forces do not provide doctors with adequate incentives to take care.
As Professor Weiler reveals, this market failure is not solved by
the current system of imposing medical malpractice liability directly
on the doctors or other health care workers responsible for a pa-
tient's loss.' 2 ' The problem for negligence liability arises in large
part from the prevalence of liability insurance. This medical mal-
practice liability insurance is not experience-rated. 22 Accordingly,
because doctors know that their insurance company will bear the
cost of any liability, malpractice liability does not provide doctors
with adequate incentives to take due care. The deterrent effects of
the present system are further muted by the fact that victims of neg-
ligent medical treatment often do not file claims.'2 3
117. Cf. Arlen, supra note 97 (exploring the conflict between efficient activity levels
and efficient monitoring under a rule of absolute liability).
118. See generally Weiler, supra note 5.
119. Id. at 915.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 917.
122. Id. at 914-915.
123. See id. at 913.
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In an attempt to solve the two central problems of the current
medical malpractice system-that doctors are not adequately de-
terred from being negligent and deserving victims are not compen-
sated for their injuries-Professor Weiler proposes that we replace
the current system of fault-based liability with a system under which
hospitals, not doctors, are absolutely liable for patients' injuries
caused by medical treatment performed at the hospital.124 Weiler's
explicit focus on deterrence distinguishes his proposal from the two
other plans presented in this Symposium. Under his system, a vic-
tim's recovery would be based on her pecuniary losses (as they arise
over time), and would include some recovery for nonpecuniary
losses (determined by a compensation schedule). 125 The program
would be administered by a specialized tribunal that would develop
criteria and schedules to determine compensable events and appro-
priate payments for nonpecuniary losses. 126 It is expected that hos-
pitals and health care organizations subject to this system would
self-insure.
Adopting Professor Weiler's system would solve many of the
problems plaguing the current system of fault-based liability. Shift-
ing liability from doctors (who do not bear the costs of their negli-
gence because of liability insurance) to hospitals and health care
organizations might well dramatically increase the deterrent effects
of medical malpractice liability. Imposing absolute liability on hos-
pitals would provide them with incentives to monitor the doctors
they employ: those doctors who fail to take adequate care would be
sanctioned or removed from the hospital. Moreover, switching to
absolute hospital liability could be expected to result in more accu-
rate determinations of whether a doctor was negligent, because hos-
pitals probably are better qualified than the courts to make such
determinations. i27
Professor Weiler's system also would better serve the goal of
victim compensation than the current system because under his sys-
tem people injured on account of medical treatment would not need
to show fault in order to recover; those injured and in need of com-
pensation would receive it. Moreover, Professor Weiler's proposal
124. Professor Weiler specifically targets hospitals and other health care organiza-
tions under whose auspices the patient was treated (including all care rendered by doc-
tors affiliated with the hospitals). Id. at 920.
125. Id. at 922-924.
126. Id. at 935.
127. Hospitals subject to absolute liability can be expected to investigate whether the
health care provider was at fault in determining whether to sanction the health care
provider whose actions resulted in the patient's injury.
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that nonpecuniary loss recovery be determined by a compensation
schedule would solve many of the problems of fraud and abuse that,
as Gary Schwartz shows, currently plague nonpecuniary loss recov-
ery under administrative compensation systems.'
28
Accordingly, there is much to recommend in Professor Weiler's
proposal: its central goals of deterrence and compensation are the
appropriate central goals of a liability system and the means he has
chosen to achieve these goals generally are consistent with them.
Despite these strengths, concerns remain about the deterrent effect
of his system; additional amendments to his system might be re-
quired in order to address the remaining concern of fraud and
abuse.
A. Impact of Strict Liability on Hospitals' Incentives to Monitor
One possible problem with Professor Weiler's proposal is his
decision to employ absolute liability. Professor Weiler intends for
his system to induce hospitals both to monitor for doctor negligence
and to sanction doctors who regularly fail to take due care. Impos-
ing absolute liability on hospitals often will provide hospitals with
the desired incentives to monitor for doctor negligence. There are
circumstances where absolute liability may not achieve this goal,
however. For hospitals to control excessive risk taking by doctors,
and to sanction those doctors who are negligent, hospitals must
keep records and act upon the information they have about doctor
misfeasance. Under Weiler's system, keeping this information may
increase the hospital's expected liability, however. This is because
under his system a hospital is not liable for every injury a patient
suffers while under its care, but rather only those injuries attributed
to the medical treatment given to the patient. A patient cannot al-
ways determine, on her own, whether her injury resulted from a pre-
existing condition or from the treatment she received. 129 Accord-
ingly, absent additional information, some patients who could pur-
sue claims against the hospital may choose not to, believing that
their injuries resulted from pre-existing conditions. Patients at hos-
pitals that keep detailed records may be more likely to pursue
claims, however, because they may be able to obtain hospital
records regarding their medical treatment and any associated disci-
plinary proceedings, providing the requisite information on whether
their injuries resulted from the treatment they received. This possi-
128. See generally Schwartz, supra note 43.
129. Weiler, supra note 5, at 913.
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bility that hospital records might be used to establish a hospital's
liability to the patient will act as a disincentive to hospitals to moni-
tor doctors appropriately. If these records increase the likelihood of
a hospital being found liable by more than the amount that monitor-
ing decreases the expected amount (and cost) of patient injuries,
then a hospital subject to absolute liability may respond by not mon-
itoring and disciplining its doctors. 3 ° This possibility must be con-
sidered and addressed before any attempt is made to implement
Professor Weiler's proposal, and amendments to the proposal
designed to remedy this problem should be considered.
One possible solution to the problem that warrants considera-
tion is to impose a fine on any hospital that does not engage in opti-
mal record keeping and monitoring. A properly designed fine
should provide hospitals with the requisite incentive to monitor
their employees. An obvious problem with this solution, however, is
that it transforms Professor Weiler's relatively simple no-fault sys-
tem into a system where fault is an issue, thereby increasing admin-
istrative costs and the possibility of error.
There is an another possible solution to this problem, however,
which should be explored. This would be to permit-and en-
courage-hospitals to shift their liability to the responsible medical
personnel if the hospital can show, through its records, which of its
health care professionals was responsible for the patient's injury.
Enabling the hospital to shift its liability to the individuals responsi-
ble for the patient's harm would provide the hospital with an incen-
tive to monitor its agents: any increase in the hospital's expected
liability as a result of monitoring would be reduced, if not elimi-
nated, by the effect of monitoring on the hospital's ability to shift its
liability to the responsible parties. Certainly, this possibility war-
rants consideration. Moreover, a system in which hospitals attempt
to impose liability on the health care workers responsible for pa-
tients' harms probably would be more accurate than the current sys-
tem in which patients (and juries) attempt to determine who is
responsible for their injuries, because the system would encourage
hospitals to obtain and reveal information. Whether in the end this
solution is worth pursuing depends on whether the concern that
strict liability will not provide adequate incentives to monitor is a
serious one, and on whether imposing liability on doctors and
health care workers for the injuries they cause would have other un-
130. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100; Arlen, supra note 97, at 5-6.
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desirable consequences. 131
B. Efficient Damage Awards
Even if the preceding problem can be solved, another problem
remains: under Professor Weiler's proposal, hospitals' liability is
not sufficiently high to provide them with efficient incentives to re-
duce risk. Standard economic theory concludes that in order to pro-
vide hospitals with efficient incentives to reduce risk, hospitals must
internalize the full social cost of the risks imposed on patients. Ac-
cordingly, in order to provide a hospital with efficient incentives, a
hospital's expected liability should at least be equal to the full social
cost of the injuries its patients suffer as a result of medical treat-
ment.'" 2 Under Professor Weiler's proposed recovery rule, how-
ever, a hospital's total expected liability is based largely on its
patients' pecuniary losses. This amount, as previously shown, is less
than the social cost of the risk of patient injury-this being the
amount that would compensate each member of the affected popu-
lation for the risk imposed on them.' 3 Accordingly, each hospital's
expected liability under Weiler's system is not sufficiently high to
deter risk creation efficiently.
Nor will Professor Weiler's system result in efficient risk-
spreading by victims. This is because under his system the recovery
awarded to victims of serious injuries exceeds their pecuniary losses,
and thus appears to exceed the efficient amount of insurance cover-
age.' 34 In addition, allowing victims to recover for pecuniary losses
as they arise creates a moral hazard problem and increases the likeli-
hood of fraud. A victim who is guaranteed compensation for her
pecuniary losses has little incentive to minimize those losses by lim-
iting her medical treatment to necessary treatment and by returning
to work as soon as possible. In addition, as Gary Schwartz reveals,
unethical health care professionals may take advantage of this sys-
tem to run up large fees for unnecessary services.135
131. Whether this solution would work also would depend on whether the doctors'
insurance under such a system would be experience-rated.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19; but see Arlen, supra note 97 (suggesting
that under enterprise liability, damages might need to exceed the social cost of the harm
when the purpose of enterprise liability is not to induce efficient monitoring).
133. One estimate of the value of life based on this measure is $3-6 million. See supra
text accompanying notes 13-19. The amount of the victim's recovery also would be less
than the full cost to the victim of the actual harm suffered, and thus would not force the
hospital to internalize the full cost of the harms actually suffered. See supra note 19.
134. See supra note 33 and text accompanying notes 26-33.
135. See generally Schwartz, supra note 43.
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Altering the recovery rule to provide the correct incentives is
more difficult than it might first appear, however. Under a system of
absolute liability, a single recovery rule must induce both efficient
deterrence and efficient risk-spreading (assuming hospitals self-in-
sure). This is not possible, however, because the damage award
necessary for efficient deterrence exceeds the award that permits ef-
ficient risk-spreading by victims.'1 6 Accordingly, under an absolute
liability rule, it would be necessary to implement a recovery rule that
compromises between the two goals. The conflict between deter-
rence and risk-spreading could be reduced, however, by altering the
structure of the system. For example, it might be desirable to intro-
duce a central insurance system: hospitals would contribute to the
system based on the social cost of the risks they create and victims
could recover an amount equal to their total pecuniary losses, with
the remaining sums going to administrative expenses and to provid-
ing compensation to victims of insolvent institutions.13 7 Considera-
tion should be given to whether the victim's recovery should be
awarded in a lump-sum amount, based on expected future pecuni-
ary losses, as opposed to periodic payments over time as the losses
arise. An obvious disadvantage of a lump-sum payment is that it is
less accurate than periodic awards because it requires courts to esti-
mate victims' future losses. Nevertheless, lump-sum payments have
a considerable advantage: they provide victims with a strong incen-
tive to refrain from obtaining unnecessary medical treatment-be-
cause each victim must pay for this treatment herself-and to return
to work as soon as possible. Similarly, lump-sum awards make it
somewhat more difficult for health care providers to defraud hospi-
tals by charging the hospital's victims for unnecessary medical ex-
penses. Victims who know that the doctor's fees will come out of
their lump-sum awards will monitor the doctors more carefully than
they would otherwise.'3' To further deter fraud, compensation for
medical services provided after the victim's injury and before recov-
ery is awarded should be limited to reasonable fees for the services
136. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 and notes 29, 33.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
138. The risk of fraud may be somewhat less in the medical malpractice context than
in the case of products liability or workers' compensation because (1) hospitals can re-
duce the risk of fraud by offering to provide the services themselves for free, and (2)
they are in a good position to monitor other doctors for fraud. Nevertheless, lump-sum
payments still might be preferable because they provide victims with incentives to mini-
mize other pecuniary losses, such as lost wage income.
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rendered. ' 9
C. Public versus Private Hospitals
Finally, it must be recognized that the deterrent arguments in
favor of Professor Weiler's proposal may not apply to public hospi-
tals, whose directors are not necessarily driven primarily by profit
maximization concerns. To the extent that directors of public hos-
pitals are driven by political concerns-and not profit maximiza-
tion-Professor Weiler's system will not provide them with
adequate incentives to reduce risks.
Moreover, there is an additional problem with applying Profes-
sor Weiler's system to public hospitals. Imposing liability on hospi-
tals in essence transforms hospitals into insurers of their services.
This is likely to increase the cost of medical services, because each
hospital will include its expected liability costs in the price it charges
for its services. This may reduce the quality of care for certain low
income people, who are too poor to afford this additional cost (and
are too wealthy to get free medical services) and who thus may not
be able to afford any medical treatment at all. Moreover, imposing
absolute liability on hospitals also will increase the cost to local and
state governments of providing medical services for the indigent be-
cause they will have to pay to provide both medical treatment and
medical treatment insurance. Accordingly, although few would
deny that doctors at public hospitals should be induced to provide
the poor with good medical treatment, the issues of whether abso-
lute hospital liability will create the correct incentives when applied
to public hospitals-and at what cost in terms of restricting the
number of patients the hospitals will be able to serve-warrant addi-
tional consideration. 140
139. See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 988-89 (explaining that workers' compensation's
provision of full recovery for the injured employee's actual medical expenses has en-
couraged the creation of "workers' compensation mills," which provide workers with the
legal assistance and medical evidence necessary to press a claim, with the mills profiting
from the recovery for the excessive bills for medical services).
140. These concerns might appear to be solved by Professor Weiler's conclusion that
his system should be purely voluntary: each hospital should offer patients the option to
elect no-fault coverage. Weiler, supra note 5, at 944. This option will not solve the
problem of medical liability driving poor patients from the market, however, if the alter-
native to electing no-fault medical liability is for doctors to remain under the current
system of fault-based medical malpractice. In this situation, doctors are likely to put
considerable pressure on hospitals to elect no-fault medical liability.
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CONCLUSION
Each of the proposals presented in this Symposium would be an
improvement over the current system in a variety of ways. Each sys-
tem probably would have lower administrative costs. In addition,
the amount of victim compensation generally would induce efficient
risk-spreading by victims, which currently often is precluded by the
substantial damages awarded under the tort system.
But the tort system has an additional central goal: deterrence.
This goal cannot be ignored in designing a compensation system, at
least not one intended to replace the tort system. Efficient deter-
rence imposes certain requirements on a compensation system, re-
quirements that each of the systems satisfy in part, but not in full.
Specifically, to deter risk-creation efficiently, each risk-imposer's ex-
pected liability to the compensation system should equal the ex-
pected social costs of the risk she creates. 14 ' In addition, the
recovery awarded to victims should be structured to provide victims
with proper incentives to reduce the cost of the harms they suffer,
and to deter fraud. Moreover, in some cases, more analysis is
needed on the impact of the compensation system on injurers' in-
centives to obtain and reveal information about risks. Additional
analysis is also is needed on the impact of strict liability on a princi-
pal's incentives to monitor risk taking by its agents. Only when
these issues are fully examined will it be possible to design a com-
pensation system capable of providing the correct incentives. Fi-
nally, additional analysis is needed on the real-world functioning of
compensation systems, such as that presented by Professor
Schwartz.
This is not to say that in the meantime nothing should change.
Given the enormous costs of the current tort system, in some cir-
cumstances it may be preferable to switch to a compensation system,
although the compensation system should be designed with deter-
rence concerns in mind. Mass environmental torts and medical mal-
practice may be areas where a compensation system (properly
designed) is preferable to the tort system. The case for a compensa-
tion system for mass product-related torts is somewhat less clear.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, automobile accidents appear to be
one area where the current tort system-with all its flaws-may well
be preferable to a compensation system.
141. Moreover, the issue of how to provide proper incentives to obtain information
about risk must be considered in more detail.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix demonstrates that the cost to each motorist of
driving is higher under a system where each individual is fully com-
pensated for her own losses but is fully liable for the pecuniary and
nonpecuniary losses of anyone she injures, than it would be under a
system where each individual only pays her own costs, insuring
against pecuniary but not nonpecuniary losses. Accordingly, this
Appendix shows that the cost to motorists of driving would fall were
the "choice" no-fault plan to be adopted. This fall in costs would
increase activity levels above their current excessive levels.
I. THE MODEL
Assume that there are two identical risk-averse motorists, and
each individual is endowed with wealth, W; 42 to simplify the analy-
sis, it is assumed that W includes the benefit to each individual of
driving (and that care levels are fixed). 43 Each motorist faces a risk
of being involved in an accident with the other motorist. To sim-
plify the analysis, it is assumed that the probability of an accident is
given by p.' 4 4 Should an accident occur, a number of things may
happen: both individuals may escape injury, both may be injured,
or one may be physically injured and the other may not. It is as-
sumed that the probability that the first motorist will be physically
injured is q and the probability that the second motorist will be
physically injured is r.
Consistent with Professor O'Connell's analysis, it is assumed
that each individual risks suffering the same serious permanent
physical injury. This physical injury has two distinct impacts on the
victim: first, it results in a pecuniary loss, and second, the injury
directly alters the victim's utility function. These effects are repre-
sented mathematically as follows. The purely pecuniary loss is rep-
resented as a reduction of m in the injured individual's wealth,
where m is measured in dollars. The direct impact of the injury on
the victim's utility function is represented in this model by the use of
142. IV can be thought of as being composed of both the monetary value of the bun-
dle of all other commodities possessed by the individual and the net present value of the
individual's expected lifetime income.
143. Care levels are assumed to be fixed to show that Professor O'Connell's proposal
will increase expected accident costs even if, as he asserts, his proposal has no impact on
motorists' caretaking.
144. The assumption that the probability of an accident is fixed is employed only to
simplify the math in order to allow us to consider the impact on an individual's welfare
of eliminating nonpecuniary losses.
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the term Uh(W) to describe the utility function of the individual
when healthy and U,(W) to describe her utility function once in-
jured. It is assumed that an individual is better off healthy than in-
jured: that is, that Uh(W) > U,(W).1 4 5 As for the impact of the
injury on the victim's marginal utility of wealth, Professor
O'Connell's claim that individuals only insure for purely pecuniary
losses requires the assumption that Uh'(W) = Ui'(W).' 46 Finally, it is
assumed that not being injured, in other words being healthy, is a
"normal good," which in turn implies that the wealthier an individ-
ual is, the more she will be willing to spend to avoid being
injured. 147
Both individuals and courts are assumed to possess perfect in-
formation which is costlessly obtained.' 4  Litigation and settlement
costs are assumed to be zero. As in the current tort system, it is
assumed that damages are paid only if an individual suffers a physi-
cal injury and that people with identical injuries collect identical
damages. To spread risks, people can purchase first-party insurance
coverage ("accident insurance"), A, and third-party insurance ("lia-
bility insurance"), L, in fair insurance markets. 149 It is assumed that
the collateral-source rule applies (thus, the tort victim's receipt of
insurance benefits does not affect the amount of damages she can
collect from the tortfeasor). 150
II. THE ANALYSIS
Consider now Professor O'Connell's argument that shifting to a
first-party system with no recovery for nonpecuniary losses will not
145. See, e.g., Arlen, Efficient Tort Rules, supra note 1; Robert Cooter, Towards a Mjarket in
Unmatured Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 388-91 (1989); David Friedman, What is 'Fair Com-
pensation'for Death or Injury?, 2 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 85-86 (1982); SHAVELL, supra
note 13, at 228-35, 245-54; see also Cook & Graham, supra note 27, at 146 (describing the
impact on the utility function of the loss of an irreplaceable commodity).
146. This is a common assumption. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 29, at 1546-47 (ex-
plaining that individuals will not insure themselves against nonpecuniary losses);
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 366 ("[Tlhere is no good reason to suppose that, apart from
causing pecuniary harm, accidents commonly increase persons' marginal utility for
money."). For an analysis of the validity of this assumption, see the sources cited supra
note 29.
147. See Cook & Graham, supra note 27, at 147 & n.9.
148. This assumption is more favorable to O'Connell's no-fault proposal than is the
alternative assumption that courts often err. See supra note 65.
149. In other words, it is assumed that the insurance company sets the premium equal
to its expected liability under the policy.
150. In effect, this means that the insured's premium will be based on the assumption
that the insurance company does not incur any costs if the insured is fully compensated
by the other party to the accident.
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affect a motorist's total expected costs because the motorist is sim-
ply paying the full costs of the injury to herself rather than paying
the full cost of the injury to someone else. The motorist's expected
utility when she only bears her own accident costs is given by:
EU = (l-pq) Uh(W - pqm) + pqUi(W - pqm)
where pqm equals the accident insurance premium paid by the mo-
torist. The motorist's expected utility if she must fully compensate
anyone she injures, but receives full compensation if she is injured
is:
EV = (1--p)Uh [W - pqrA - p(I-q)rL] + p(1-q)(1-r)Uh[W -
pqrA - p(1-q)rL ] + p(1-q)rUh[W- pqrA - p(1-q)rL - D + L] +
pq(1-r)UJW - pqrA - p(1-q)rL - m + D] + pqrU[W - pqrA -
p(1-q)rL - m + D - D + A].
Assuming that D fully compensates the victim for her loss,' 5 ' and
that the victim only insures against purely pecuniary losses, this im-
plies that:
EV = (I-pq) Uh[W-pqrm -p(1-q)rD] + pq(1-r) Uh[W -- pqrm -
p(1-q)rD] + pqrU,[W - pqrm - p(1-q)rD].
The question is, which is greater, EU or EV. We know that the
motorist with expected utility EU could obtain expected utility EV
by fully insuring against any injury to herself resulting from an acci-
dent where she is injured and the other party is not. Assuming that
Uh'(W) = U'(W), however, the individual would not purchase this
coverage because the utility she derives from the money she would
have to spend on premium payments exceeds the utility she would
derive from the additional coverage she would receive if injured.
Accordingly, EU > EV. This implies that the cost to an individual
of driving is lower under O'Connell's plan, in which case switching
to his plan will lower costs, thereby increasing motorists' activity
levels above the already excessive current levels-in turn, increasing
expected accident costs.
151. This implies that: U[JI' - pqrni - p(1-q)rD - m + DI = U1[l" - pqrm -
p(1-q)rD].
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